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This article explores the technological choices made at the 
dawn of the massification of retail finance.  We describe 
and analyze the early development of electronic banking 
and the foundations of the cashless society through the 
experiences of organizations with similar governance in two 
different competitive environments — Swedish and British 
savings banks. We document how the adoption of direct-to-
account wage deposits and the subsequent deployment of 
networks of cash dispensers interacted with the adoption of 
on-line real-time (OLRT) computing, and distinguish on-
line and OLRT communication as distinct stages in the 
evolution of computer networks. We emphasize the role of 
middle managers in the selection of alternative technologies 
and show how delivering a cashless society proved more 
difficult than anticipated. 
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By the mid-1960s bankers in Europe and North America were 
already familiar with the idea that the interconnection of computer 
systems could deliver a cashless society.1 Simultaneously, they had to 
deal with the practical problems of managing an increasing number of 
customers because, at the time most “bank customers were paid weekly 
and at Friday lunchtime they flooded into branches to raise money for the 
weekend.  The result was often chaotic with long queues and delays and 
the need for extra cashiers.”  2   
Almost half a century later, it is claimed that not even the homeless 
in Sweden accept cash.3 A cashless society requires the digitalization of 
activities inside and outside financial institutions. Initial steps in the 
digitalization of retail payments and the massification of retail finance 
relied on an ensemble of organizational processes and emergent 
technologies, in particular the successful deployment of direct-to-account 
payments and cash dispensers. This article maps the early development 
of these technologies in two competitive environments: Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.  
One reason for considering these two countries is that Richard 
Grossman selects them as worthy of in-depth analysis in his history of 
commercial banking.4 In this paper we take stock of Grossman’s 
approach while also departing from the predominant view in financial 
history, which documents the experiences of commercial banks, by 
exploring organizational changes associated with the automation of not-
for-profit financial institutions in the UK and Sweden. In this regard and 
according to a contemporary account by Richard Sprague, the view of 
US regulators participating in the creation of an electronic fund transfer 
system in the mid-1970s was informed by developments in Europe and 
most notably those around the cash-dispenser networks of British and 
Swedish savings banks.5 Our approach thus enables an international 
comparison of the evolution of the same technologies and an 
organizational form with similar corporate governance in two distinct 
competitive environments. The result is a detailed account of how two 
loose federations came together to achieve scale and scope economies, 
contest retail banking markets and thereby overcome the apparent 
advantages of large, diversified financial institutions in the use and 
application of computer technology.6 We also contribute to the debate 
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concerning the impact of “thicker markets”, reduced transaction costs 
and greater relative income in the late twentieth century on the 
Chandlerian firm.7 
Our comparison also departs from the predominant view in financial 
history, by contributing to a growing number of studies documenting the 
process of office automation of financial institutions. These studies 
emphasize the underlying infrastructure that supported computerization 
and digitalization of financial markets and institutions.8 However, little 
attention has been paid to the question as to how applications of 
computer technology were used for building networks of information 
within retail financial markets, and how this, in turn, promised to deliver 
a cash-free economy.  
Here we follow the approach of Yates in studying organizations, 
rather than individuals, as users of computers.9 But we must not forget 
that organizations consist of people, and institutions exist within the 
minds of individuals and are reproduced and enacted in their daily 
interactions. Hence it is also important to consider the role of different 
occupational groups and practices in the evolution of computer use.10 
This approach requires us to combine several distinct perspectives11 and, 
in turn, highlights the importance of middle managers in shaping 
technological decisions. Here we follow Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo and 
Thomas Haigh in adopting what might be called “history from the 
middle out”, in which technical experts and junior managers located deep 
within the organizational chart of a large, chaotic network of small and 
medium-sized banks attempt to reshape their structure, culture and 
practices to their own advantage.12 The introduction of computer 
technology provided a powerful tool for the rise of a new, technocratic 
class within British and Swedish savings banks. Managers in both 
organizational forms had similar incentives to adopt computer 
technology, but as will be evident below, each group found different 
solutions to similar challenges.  
Also of importance to our story is the adoption of on-line real-time 
(OLRT) computing during the 1960s and 1970s in the context of a 
possible cash-free society (which was forecast on the back of emerging 
networks of cash dispensers during the 1970s and 1980s). OLRT systems 
are based on the notion of synchronous communication. The 
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predominant approach is to consider the development of OLRT systems 
in a single move but this process was less straightforward for banks, as 
Ian Martin shows.13 Computer technology (and specifically cash 
dispensers) decoupled the concurrence in time and space of humans as 
providers and recipients of retail financial services, by offering a device 
that was more than a simple calculating machine but could follow the 
same set of rules as the bank teller.  However, early cash dispensers 
operated off-line or updated central records in batch processes,14 that is, 
they were at best on-line but certainly asynchronous computer systems. 
Such a proposition was unacceptable for the savings banks, because 
regulatory constraints inhibited their ability to offer overdraft facilities. 
Hence a growing customer base required savings banks to achieve full 
OLRT interconnection between cash withdrawal and central records at 
the moment of the transaction. Without this, cash dispensing involved 
some form of human intervention. Accordingly it is full OLRT that 
distinguishes the cash-dispensing machine from the automated teller 
machine (ATM).15 Therefore in retail finance there were important legal, 
accounting, organizational, and final-user implications of OLRT. As a 
result, our research suggests there are specific conditions inside banking 
organizations that require considering on-line (OL) and OLRT as two 
distinct stages of development in the adoption of computer technology. 
Our research also documents how European financial intermediaries 
were active in shaping technological change in the process of the 
diffusion of OLRT computing and cash dispensers.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section 
provides background material relating to the origins and growth of 
savings banks in Britain and Sweden. The third section details the 
computerization of savings banks, focusing on how the introduction of 
direct-to-account wage deposit was the trigger for the computerization of 
Swedish savings banks, while the decimalization of sterling was the key 
event in Britain. The fourth section describes the adoption of OLRT 
computing and cash dispensers. In documenting the adoption of 
computers and cash dispensers we describe events in chronological 
order, typically placing those in Sweden before those in Britain. 
Moreover, we document how these developments were intertwined with 
those of two engineering companies, namely Speytec (later purchased by 
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Burroughs) in the UK and Metior (later becoming Asea-Metior) in 
Sweden. The fifth and final section offers a comparison of similarities 
and differences between the Swedish and British experience, as well as 
our conclusions. 
 
Common origins 
Trustee savings banks 
Savings banks date back to 1810 in Scotland, from where they 
expanded to other European nations during the nineteenth century while 
building upon ideas about creating habits of thrift within the proletariat.16 
There were different forms of savings banks in the UK (including the 
National Security Savings Bank system and the Post Office Savings 
Bank, later called National Savings Bank), but our research only deals 
with the largest number of similar organizations, namely the so-called 
trustee savings banks (TSBs).  
The governance of the savings banks was different from other 
corporate bodies because there was no ultimate owner, while deposits 
were invested in low-risk (government) securities rather than used to 
provide loans.17  The funds and operation of the savings banks were 
under the control of voluntary managers or trustees (hence the roots of 
the TSB acronym), none of whom was to derive any benefit from that 
office.18 There were 231 TSBs in the UK at the end of the nineteenth 
century.19 Most remained as a series of autonomous entities, many of 
them ‘unit banks’ (where the whole organization was encapsulated 
within the premises of a single retail office) as late as 1970. 
Since 1817 in England (and 1835 in Scotland), accumulated deposits 
had to be invested in government debt (through the Commissioners for 
the Reduction of National Debt),20 while the Savings Bank Act of 1891 
curtailed early attempts to broaden their activities. It was not until 1965 
that the TSB was allowed to issue current accounts, undertake the 
payment of utility bills and safeguard securities and valuables. 
Regulatory changes, therefore, limited the potential diversification of the 
British savings banks’ investment portfolios and curtailed opportunities 
for direct lending to retail customers, while their business remained in 
collecting low-volume deposits.  
Bátiz-Lazo, Karlsson, and Thodenius 
 
105 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXII, 2014 
After World War Two, some TSBs began to open retail branches and 
sub-branches.21 These came from organic developments in close 
geographical proximity to ‘head-office’, responding to changes in local 
economic conditions while avoiding the sphere of influence of another 
savings bank.22 The emergence of a retail branch network for the whole 
movement was cautious in terms of the number of retail outlets: with 386 
in 1911, reaching 1,505 in 1970 (30 for the Preston bank and 37 for the 
Belfast bank)23 and peaking at 1,650 in 1981.24 New and refitted 
branches would always be inaugurated with a ‘loud fanfare’, often 
accompanied by ‘an impressive civic opening ceremony’.25  
By 1960 the distribution in terms of the number of banks and size of 
assets was highly skewed. The north of England and Scotland had the 
largest number of banks and accounts, with the largest banks in terms of 
assets located in urban centers (namely London, Glasgow, Edinburgh 
and Belfast), and the largest concentration of assets located in the south 
east of England.26 The TSB’s share of total sterling deposits made by UK 
residents diminished from 9.2 percent in 1962 (£16.5 million) to 6.2 
percent in 1976 (£69.8 million).27  
As part of a change in government policy, the 70 or so remaining 
TSBs amalgamated into a single institution between 1970 and 1985. This 
entity was then floated on the London Stock Exchange as part of 
Margaret Thatcher’s privatization program in 1986. Given its unique 
governance the proceeds of the flotation were reinvested in their entirety 
as working capital. Nine years later in 1995, Lloyds Bank acquired the 
TSB Group, only to re-launch the brand as an independent bank while 
divesting itself of some 600 retail branches in 2013 as a result of a ruling 
by the European Commission.  
 
Swedish savings banks 
The first Swedish savings banks were inspired by the Scottish model 
and established in the early nineteenth century as non-profit 
organizations with the purpose of encouraging thrift amongst poor 
people. The number of savings banks increased rapidly until 1926 when 
they reached a peak of 497.28  The Swedish savings banks were 
originally thought of as conservative strongholds, but after the 
democratic breakthrough they became more aligned with the labor 
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movement.29 This was clearly manifested in 1945, when the savings 
banks gave striking metal workers respite from loan repayments.30 Over 
time, it also became increasingly common to find union officials on the 
boards of savings banks. 
The Swedish savings banks association (Svenska 
sparbanksföreningen) was established in 1900, some ten years after a 
similar organization had been established in the UK (1887). Like its US 
and Spanish counterparts,31 the Swedish association played an important 
role in elevating the public image of thrift and from the 1920s onwards, 
lobbying government on behalf of its members.32 In 1925 the savings 
banks association established a department for propaganda, later named 
Sparfrämjandet, to serve as a publishing house and a central purchasing 
unit.33 In 1943 it became an independent company comprising three 
departments, namely publishing, external relations and central 
purchasing. As will be evident below, Sparfrämjandet played a key role 
in the computerization of Swedish savings banks - a process rooted in the 
introduction of direct-to-account payroll deposit services in that country. 
The decades that followed the end of World War Two were 
characterized by overall economic growth, increased affluence and 
expansion of the welfare state in Sweden. This era also saw increased 
competition in the banking sector as the commercial banks began to 
attract a variety of new customers, including wage-earners. 
Handelsbanken and other commercial banks used the contacts developed 
while financing the working capital of manufacturing companies to offer 
these companies direct payroll deposit services. In a similar move, the 
birth of direct payroll services in Britain took place in 1958 when 
clearing (i.e. joint-stock commercial) banks were allowed to offer 
payment by checks or bank credit to any worker who specifically 
requested or sanctioned it.34  
The savings banks were initially hesitant in responding to this new 
service, but a group of younger managers pushed for a more aggressive 
corporate strategy.35 Throughout the 1950s these young managers, under 
the leadership of Sven G. Svensson, director of Sparfrämjandet, were 
united by the idea that the savings banks had to adjust to ongoing social 
change.36 They were convinced that the savings banks should meet the 
challenge of Handelsbanken, not by demanding protection from the state 
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but by introducing better services. Many of their ideas were implemented 
as Svensson’s followers reached influential positions.37 As a result the 
Swedish savings banks evolved from small-scale savings institutions to 
‘modern’ business-oriented retail financial intermediaries. During this 
process the emphasis on thrift was downplayed while the savings banks 
began to view depositors more like customers than savers.  
In 1960, most of the bigger savings banks had introduced direct 
payroll accounts and over the course of the decade, the savings banks 
had, partly by using their close contacts with trade unions, acquired a 
dominant role in the retail banking segment. Between 1962 and 1970 the 
number of accounts at the Swedish savings banks increased five-fold 
(from 143,000 to 870,000).38 This development was much more dramatic 
in Sweden than in the UK.39 However, competitive success was 
associated with rocketing costs. In order to keep up with the commercial 
banks, the savings banks had to expand their workforce. Expressed as a 
share of deposits, administration costs increased by 40 percent between 
1962 and 1967.  In the same period, the number of transactions 
(withdrawals and deposits) of the four largest savings banks increased by 
125 percent, whereas their total funds increased by 64 percent.40 At the 
same time, British savings banks were losing deposits faster than they 
could acquire them.41  
 
Adoption of computer technology 
Establishing joint on-line systems around Spadab in Sweden42 
By the end of the 1950s, the use of mechanical and electro-
mechanical accounting machines was widespread among the Swedish 
savings banks.43 At the same time, rising administrative costs and an 
increasing number of accounts in the late 1950s and 1960s required 
Swedish savings banks to take action, and the then-emerging application 
of computers to business seemed to offer a solution. A major step 
towards computerization was taken in 1958, when the Swedish savings 
banks association formed a Technical Committee. This occured after a 
delegation had visited the USA in 1957 with the aim of observing the use 
of so-called electronic computing machines by Savings and Loans.44 The 
delegation suggested similar machines might be useful for the Swedish 
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savings banks, but within a timeframe of five to ten years. One of the 
delegates stated: “there is, however, reason to be skeptical whether these 
systems will work as supposed”.45 At the time, there was also widespread 
skepticism that a large number of savings banks could work together on 
solving technical issues and making joint capital equipment investments.  
In 1959, Per Olov Rimvall took the position of chairman of the 
Technical Committee. His first decision was to form a sub-committee 
tasked with recommending the automation of bookkeeping procedures. 
The sub-committee scanned the market for suppliers of computing 
machines, receiving quotes from IBM, Ericsson, Bull, RCA and NCR. At 
this time, most of the major commercial banks had already purchased 
computers while some savings banks had started to use private computer 
service bureaus. The work of the sub-committee led in late-1961 to the 
formation of a jointly-owned computer and data-processing company 
that was later to be called Spadab. 
Spadab’s first large investment was a Stockholm computer center 
which opened for service in early 1963. It housed a Bull Gamma 30 
computer. A second center in Gothenburg soon followed. 46 By the end 
of 1963, 16 savings banks used the Stockholm center and 15 banks the 
Gothenburg center. A third center was opened in the south at Linkoping. 
Each center was sub-divided into three main areas: the mainframe room, 
the punching room and a room for the distribution unit. The Stockholm 
Savings Bank had developed its own computing facilities, which became 
the fourth computing center in the Swedish consortium in 1966. A fifth 
and final center was opened in Malmö in 1967. The engineering group in 
Malmö carried out some explorations of computer technology outside of 
Spadab, and, following development at the Malmö center, OLRT 
services really took off in 1974 when 15 savings banks were connected 
in a nationwide on-line network. 
 
Catching up and overtaking in England 
British savings banks were “late” adopters of computer technology 
when compared to developments in automating passbook-based accounts 
in Sweden and even the USA.47 Contrary to developments in Sweden or 
Spain, their industry association failed to grow in strength and offer 
support as well as resolve scale disadvantages in computer adoption. By 
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the mid-1960s, the mechanization of the British savings banks was 
largely incipient: most TSBs had just started to use mechanical and 
electro-mechanical equipment to speed up internal processes such as the 
accounting function.48  
Table 1 summarizes the process of computerization of the savings 
banks in Britain. This started with an early experiment by banks in and 
around London to develop a clearing center in Surrey. Yet the big 
incentive to roll out the computer revolution across all TSBs was the 
decimalization of sterling in 1971, while using the bureau service offered 
by a subsidiary of the Post Office, the National Data Processing Service 
(NDPS), to deal with the cost of capital investment and the lack of 
technical skills. Most English and Welsh banks were mapped to this 
bureau service. During this period, transactions at the branches were 
collated onto paper tape at regional offices and then processed overnight 
on NDPS machines. However, this form of batch processing, strictly 
speaking, broke the law, which required that information in the 
customer’s passbook match that in the bank’s ledger at all times. The 
TSBs wanted to develop some form of communication whereby the 
computer record was updated immediately, as the transaction took place 
at the retail branch.  
After decimalization, operations were brought in-house and replaced 
by nine processing centers servicing 48 banks and some 1,550 retail bank 
branches.49 At the same time, however, some banks decided to go it 
alone (such as those around Manchester, in the West Midlands and in 
Northern Ireland). Yet as the British savings banks amalgamated into a 
single entity, they managed to maintain heterogeneity across banks in 
administrative processes and other computer-related applications.50 This 
apparent high degree of standardization was influenced by the nature and 
type of work at the savings banks. Their 1,524 retail branches in 1971 
were large in number by US standards, but small compared with British 
commercial banks. For instance, Lloyds Bank (the smallest of the big 
four commercial banks in terms of assets) had 2,384 retail branches and 
34,368 employees in the UK.51 By 1971 most clearing banks had 
developed computer expertise in-house, notably within accounting and 
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operations and methods departments.55 To develop similar capabilities, 
savings banks had to recruit from the market, especially engineers with 
experience in on-line systems such as airlines and television. 
Although the savings banks had a large number of accounts, their daily 
volume of transactions was low relative to the number of accounts.55 At the 
same time, there was little variety in the type of accounts as individual banks 
essentially offered the same products and services. More than fifty standing-
order payments per account stretched the system to its limits.56 However, at 
that time, only Lloyds had seriously approached the idea of an OLRT system, 
while the other three large commercial banks (i.e. Barclays, Midland 
NatWest) delayed for at least a decade until they brought all retail branches 
on-line.  
The process of computerization of the savings banks was neither free of 
mishaps nor straightforward. For instance, speaking at the Association’s 
annual meeting in May 1975, the chairman of the then recently-formed TSB 
Computer Services Ltd. expressed his frustration at failing to secure a single 
national system and cautioned that commercial banks were taking the lead in 
on-line technology.57 A greater challenge came in 1979 when a system built 
around an ICL System 4 mainframe and an undisclosed Sperry Univac (both 
housed at the computer center in Wythenshawe, Manchester) was to replace 
all remaining independent operations with a single OLRT system.58 At the 
time, few outside of the TSB technical area and the banking and computer 
marketplace believed such a move could be possible. A manager in charge of 
the joint computer center recalls: “IBM’s attitude was you can’t do it. IBM 
wanted us to stop our system and transfer everything across to a new system 
off-line”.59 Moreover, a report on the “cost-effectiveness and human aspects 
of computerization” commissioned by the savings banks from a group of 
academics considered that the OLRT system would be more expensive than 
the off-line alternative.60 However, the view of computer specialists inside the 
savings banks was that both the report and the marketplace were overlooking 
the productivity gains that could be achieved. The implementation went ahead 
and the savings banks’ engineers were proved correct. One contemporary 
observer in the US opined that the computing success of the TSBs was 
noteworthy to the extent that: 
 
Origins of the Cashless Society, c. 1965-1985 
 
112 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXII, 2014 
The TSB ...  [has] one of the most advanced on-line networks serving 
both teller windows and ATM’s in the UK. Competition is doing very 
well in all parts of the United Kingdom and the clearing banks are in 
for some rude shocks unless they awaken to the situation.61 
 
After-hours cash-dispensing networks 
Building the Metior cash dispenser in Sweden62 
The roots of cash-dispensing technology in Sweden can be traced to 1960, 
when Hans Rausing and the Rausing Company developed at the insistence of, 
and sold through, Sparfrämjandet, coin-sorting machines for the savings 
banks.63 These machines resulted from discussions between the saving banks 
and Sparfrämjandet about the possibilities of automating cash dispensing to 
rationalize the handling of cash by human bank tellers. There was also a need 
to distribute cash out of hours and, as had been the case in the UK, after the 
banks closed retail branches on Saturdays.64 Yet in contrast to Britain where 
banks introduced cash dispensers in 1967 and then bowed to labor union 
demands to end Saturday opening hours in 1969,65 Swedish savings banks 
first terminated the Saturday service and then introduced cash dispensers. 
 Sparfrämjandet wanted some type of machine able to dispense bank 
notes, and discussed the issue with Metior. This was a manufacturer of 
automatic petrol pumps that had taken over the Rausing Company’s (now 
called Restello) production of coin-sorting machines.66 Of particular interest 
to Sparfrämjandet was Metior’s experience in the development of automatic 
passage systems and the use of personal identification number (PIN) codes.67 
After some time the proposed cooperation was not successful. Metior then 
approached the commercial bank Handelsbanken while looking for a new 
partner in the development of a cash dispenser.68 However, the then-CEO of 
Spadab, Bengt Wetterholm, reopened contact with Metior on behalf of the 
savings banks after learning about the interest of Handelsbanken.69 Surviving 
records suggest that Metior mainly interacted with Sparfrämjandet, and that 
this was the organization that had the greatest influence on the design of the 
first generation of cash dispensers in Sweden. For example, in December 
1966 when Metior was about to demonstrate its first prototype, Metior invited 
representatives from Sparfrämjandet and other organizations but none from 
Spadab.70 Nevertheless, according to a former manager at Metior, it 
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maintained good relations with Spadab while together with IBM, Spadab was, 
as mentioned, directly involved in developing on-line technology for the 
savings banks’ computer centers.71 
Metior’s first cash dispenser was shown to the press and broadcast on 
television on July 6, 1967 in Uppsala.72 This was only nine days after the first 
British cash dispenser was rolled out by Barclays Bank and De La Rue, and a 
couple of days before Handelsbanken showed their first Metior machine.  
After some more testing, the general public started to use the 24-hour-a-day 
cash dispenser in Uppsala in September 1967.  
Metior had assembled five machines by early 1968, but still referred to 
them as “prototypes”. Of these five machines, the savings banks had two and 
the commercial banks three. In the spring of 1968, serial production began 
after Sparfrämjandet ordered 20 machines. This order included a number of 
specific requirements that modified Metior’s prototypes, indicating that the 
savings banks actively contributed in shaping the new technology.73 By 
February 1970, Metior had produced 178 cash dispensers, of which 37 were 
destined for the domestic market (24 were delivered to the savings banks) and 
141 were for export.74  
The first cash dispenser went under the name utbetalningsautomat and 
later Bankomat, which became a brand name for cash dispensing in the Baltic 
Sea region. However, Handelsbanken, together with other commercial banks, 
soon acquired the copyright to this brand name for their dispensers. During its 
initial years Metior developed four generations of cash dispensers.75 The first 
generation was not sold commercially. The second and third were developed 
for the savings banks and the fourth was designed for the commercial banks 
and the French market.76  
The cards used to activate Bankomat Mark 2 and Mark 3 were made of 
steel and had punched holes for identification, and were used together with a 
PIN-code, similar to Chubb’s plastic cards.77 The Mark 2 and Mark 3 limited 
each card to one withdrawal per day, but this was unsatisfactory as it left open 
the possibility of someone making a withdrawal immediately before and 
immediately after midnight.78 The Mark 4 abandoned the punched-hole cards 
and replaced them with information embedded in a magnetic stripe that had 
been developed by the French Société Générale d’Automation. This 
technology ensured that withdrawals were made only from accounts with 
positive balances as demanded by French banks.79  
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Whereas some of the UK banks had been determined to deploy machines 
only after the resilience of their security devices had been tested,80 the first 
Swedish machines were used with only basic safeguards. Sometime after 
deployment someone discovered the algorithm used to associate card numbers 
with the PIN-code. During an Easter vacation period, this person travelled 
around Sweden withdrawing money from each and every machine he/she 
encountered, with the banks unaware until after the vacation. This incident 
served to strengthen the collaboration of the savings banks. Before the Easter 
vacation fraud, each savings bank was individually responsible for losses due 
to malfunctioning machines. After the fraud, the banks shared the risks 
associated with the new technology. Firstly, the savings banks began to share 
losses resulting from malfunctioning machines. The Easter incident also 
damaged confidence in Metior. In order to restore it, the ownership of the 
company was transferred to the weapons manufacturer Bofors in 1969, and to 
the electronic engineering company ASEA in 1973.  81  
It is worth noting that Metior had harbored ambitions to work with on-line 
technology since the very early stages of the design. According to the original 
plan, the Uppsala machine of 1967 would have been connected on-line if IBM 
had delivered an interface that enabled the Bankomat to link to a computer.82 
Instead, a claim to the world’s first commercial application of on-line cash-
dispensing technology came on May 6, 1968, when a dispenser in Malmö was 
set up to service 1,000 accounts. On-line teller terminals located on the 
counters of retail branches were connected through conventional telephone 
lines using modems to the center in Malmö, which was equipped with a third-
generation IBM 360/40 computer.83 
The procedure to turn the Metior cash dispenser into an on-line device 
involved checking the PIN locally inside the Bankomat. When verified, the 
customer’s card number and the amount requested were transmitted via the 
IBM 360 to Spadab’s computer center in Stockholm. If the account had a 
sufficient balance the return signal was positive, enabling the Bankomat to 
dispense the money. The Bankomat had an internal counter to dispense the 
correct notes, and when complete it would send an end-of-transaction 
message back to Spadab.84 Subsequent versions of the Bankomat were fitted 
with batch features to “call” the system while the Bankomat Mark 4 was able 
to connect on-line via a modem.85 However, in spite of the possibility of 
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OLRT computing, most cash dispensers at the Swedish savings banks 
operated as stand-alone, off-line devices.  
Two very important events, which became turning points in the Swedish 
history of cash dispensers, took place in 1971. The first of these was the 
decision by Swedish commercial banks to end their independent attempts to 
develop cash-dispensing technologies, by joining forces with Kungliga 
Postverket (the Post Office) and the Federation of Swedish Rural Credit 
Societies to create Bankomatcentralen (the Automatic Cash Dispenser 
Center). 86 The mission of Bankomatcentralen was to install and run cash-
dispensing equipment for the consortia, including decisions regarding 
location, marketing (under the Bankomat brand), and administration of card 
registration, data-processing, clearing and statistical information. As a big 
player in the market for cash-dispensing technology, Bankomatcentralen 
could and did influence the design of cash dispensers. For example, it 
demanded that Metior abandon its original (and otherwise ineffective) 
dispensing mechanism, which contained detectors that measured the thickness 
of each bill, so that two or more bills could not stick together causing wastage 
or stoppage.87 An alternative solution was developed by the inventor Leif 
Lundblad in the early 1970s, such that the bills were first counted in the 
machine and then dispensed in bundles.88 Bankomatcentralen considered 
Lundblad’s solution superior, and influenced Metior engineers in adopting 
it.89 
The second important event in the development of Swedish cash 
dispensers began when a newly appointed director of Spadab, Jan Rydh, 
attended the Automated Teller Machine Conference in Chicago in 1971. Rydh 
reminisced that, during discussions focusing on investments in off-line 
dispensers on the conference fringe, on impulse he made the sudden decision 
to regard investments in off-line machines a sunk (i.e. irrecoverable) cost.90 
The decision was communicated to colleagues attending the conference, and 
to the rest of the staff upon their return to Sweden. This left engineers at 
Spadab free to start what became known as the “Minuten project”. The aim 
was the large-scale adoption of on-line cash dispensers by the savings banks. 
In searching for potential suppliers, contacts were made with a number of 
manufacturers, and ultimately three companies competed for the project. 
These were the Swedish company Asea-Metior, the British company Chubb 
and the US-based company Docutel. In 1975 the savings banks finally 
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abandoned Metior by choosing Docutel as their supplier of ATM devices (that 
is, on-line cash dispensers), with the Swedish company Datasaab responsible 
for installation and service.91  
There are at least three explanations as to why the savings banks 
abandoned Metior. The first relates to Metior’s previously mentioned 
problems with security. The second concerns the weakness of the US dollar 
against the Swedish krona, making the Asea-Metior dispenser expensive 
relative to the Docutel machine.92 The third explanation is that the early 1970s 
saw the swift and widespread adoption of on-line terminals at retail branches 
across many countries. Independent producers of cash dispensers, such as 
Asea-Metior, faced difficulties as customers demanded wholly integrated 
systems93 such as those offered by Burroughs, IBM or NCR, which could 
deliver a central computer, teller terminals and cash dispensers.  
The savings banks were the first to use this new generation of cash 
dispensers, known as mini-banks or Minuten. The first machine was installed 
on May 24, 1977, and the fleet eventually grew to 600 units. From the outset 
all the Minuten were connected to a central computer in OLRT mode. Then in 
1982, Spadab searched the market for a new generation of ATM, looking to 
deploy 1,000 machines. By this time Asea-Metior had withdrawn from the 
market, and Datasaab offered an ATM of its own, developed in collaboration 
with Leif Lundblad’s Inter Innovation Company and benefiting from Docutel 
technology. However, this machine failed to fulfill the demands of Spadab. 
Instead, the savings banks chose the offer made by Ericsson (Sweden) and 
Omron (Japan) to deliver 900 ATM, thus ending the presence of Swedish 
innovators within their home market. 
 
Deploying the on-line real-time ATM network in England 
The introduction of cash-dispensing technology in the TSBs took place 
when the West Midlands made a Chubb MD2 operational at its Shrewsbury 
branch in June 1970.94 Chubb & Son’s Lock and Safe Company Group plc 
(Chubb) had been one of the pioneering firms in cash-dispensing technology 
in the UK thanks to its collaboration with Smith Industries and two large 
clearing banks, Midland Bank and Westminster Bank.95 The MD2 was a 
stand-alone machine requiring customers’ records to be updated following 
each transaction, through the mediation of a human teller. The West 
Midlands’ adoption of an MD2 followed similar moves by the clearing banks, 
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at a time when Chubb became the dominant technology in British retail 
finance during the early 1970s.96   
In a separate move, and four years after the Burroughs mainframe was 
installed in 1970, the first two “on-line” cash dispensers, the Burroughs RT 
2000 model, were made operational in Belfast in 1974.97 In this case OL 
meant that the central computer was informed of withdrawals after the cash 
had been dispensed; otherwise the transaction would have been too time-
consuming for the customer. There was no opportunity to confirm the 
availability of funds prior to dispensing cash.  
However neither of these two early experiments seems to have had 
widespread repercussions for the TSBs. Instead, the roots of what Sprague 
described as the “first community-wide ATM network”98 in the UK date back 
to the deployment of the English Electric (i.e. ICL) System 4 mainframe of 
the Manchester and District Computer Accounting Project (MADCAP).99 
Around 1970, David Wilson pointed out to the programmers that they needed 
to sort out a way to communicate effectively between the mainframe at 
MADCAP and Olivetti terminals (positioned on the counter of retail 
branches) that could be over 10, 20 or even 30 miles’ distance, and then back 
again. In the absence of random access memory and database management 
systems, MADCAP engineers came up with “Modus 11”. This was not 
encryption, but a mathematical calculation that converted the account number 
to a specific address in the file on the disc. In this way, a specific query 
resulting from a passbook inserted into a teller terminal could go straight in 
and straight out while the signal travelled through dedicated, copper wire 
telephone lines.  
“Modus 11” then became the key for a trial system of 10 Chubb cash 
dispensers. After having seen developments in London and the USA, it was 
decided that one of the “on-line” banks would move forward with the project. 
The General Manager of what was now the Manchester Regional Area 
Central Bank volunteered. There was an advantage to the trial being in 
Manchester because that was where the computer center was located, with the 
added convenience that engineers at MADCAP could respond promptly to 
any call.  
The first experiment with OLRT cash dispensers took place in 1974 and 
involved six branches wired to the Manchester computer center.100 Initially 
there were greater difficulties in making the Chubb machines functional than 
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in communication using conventional telephone lines. Soon, however, 
customers with an account in the Manchester Regional Area could make 
withdrawals from these cash dispensers. Customers were no longer tied to 
their specific bank or branch. They could withdraw from any cash dispenser 
and their account was debited immediately. Customers could also make 
balance inquiries. 
Yet despite the success of the trial, adoption by savings banks elsewhere 
was slow. As late as 1978, only very few retail branches were equipped with 
cash-dispensing equipment. Although some other banks also installed Chubb 
cash dispensers, when the TSBs wanted to embrace the technology fully, they 
found that Chubb was unable to supply the machines.101 Moreover, there was 
resistance from the South region and from Scotland, where the banks used 
off-line systems.  This was to change in 1979, when the South-East Regional 
Area ordered from Burroughs two B6800 large-scale computer systems and 
800 TD730 display terminals worth $7 million.102  
Managers had also resisted deployment on the grounds of cost, as they 
thought that cash-dispensing technology was expensive. Indeed, in 1977 a 
top-of–the-range RT 5000 Burroughs cash dispenser (a direct competitor of 
the IBM 3624 and featuring a printer and up to 4,000 bills of one or two 
denominations) ranged from $25,000 to $40,000 each (or a rent ranging from 
$860 to $1,400 per month based on a one-year contract).103 Moreover, an 
internal cost-accounting exercise at the TSBs suggested that cash-dispensing 
technology would be ineffective unless it was associated with a sharp 
decrease in the number of transactions through and off the teller’s counter. 
The situation remained at an impasse until the end of 1978, when two of the 
leading clearing banks (namely Barclays and NatWest) deployed large 
numbers of NCR 770 cash dispensers.104 TSB managers then panicked and 
pressed for cash dispensers to be rolled out throughout all regions.  
Research into potential providers to service the TSBs by the Computer 
Research and Development Unit resulted in a large order of cash dispensers 
placed with Burroughs, despite the belief of some senior managers that 
Burroughs’ technology was inferior.105 The architecture of the Burroughs cash 
dispensers was based on a system developed to the specification of the 
Midland Bank by a small engineering firm called Speytec (which later 
became part of Burroughs operations in Britain).106 At the time, Midland 
Bank’s order for 500 cash dispensers (worth £1.5 million in 1969) had been 
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the only sizable British transaction for Burroughs.107 The US computer 
manufacturer was keen to keep the custom of British financial intermediaries: 
   
… they went away and came back with another machine. It was the 
RT650. [We thought of it as] the TSB’s because [Burroughs] 
modified it to work with us. The beauty about it was it was a very 
simple machine.  We looked at NCR and they had an excellent 
machine but it was too sophisticated to talk to the system we were 
operating, we wanted something simple the system would do it 
straight the way you see and it was a bit more expensive so that was 
put aside.108  
 
As indicated in the quotation, in order to secure the sale Burroughs 
modified its equipment to suit the workings of the TSBs’ computing and 
administrative procedures. As a result of the modifications, the day-to-day 
operation of the RT650 was not challenging for human tellers at the TSBs.109 
The modifications forfeited any need for special training, as any of the 
cashiers was able to service the cash dispenser for the purposes of routine 
transactions after a brief explanation.  
Currency dispensing worked well once individual customers overcame 
their fear of the activating card not being returned, or their dislike of 
interacting with a machine rather than a human teller. There were of course 
instances where the cash card would slip through the wrong slot or the 
machine failed to dispense the correct amount (easily resolved if the customer 
returned at the end of the working day and the balance in the machine equaled 
the amount he/she claimed had not been dispensed). Yet in general, during the 
early 1980s, the Burroughs cash dispensers appear to have been free of 
specific errors or malfunctions. The TSBs benefited from the adoption of a 
tried and tested technology, after the clearing banks had endured the “teething 
problems”110 with early currency dispenser prototypes.  
 In summary, the TSBs became the first UK retail financial institutions to 
adopt a full OLRT system. Through this process, the savings banks created 
the largest network of computers and introduced leading-edge software 
applications for the detection of fraud and the management of cash dispensers 
(eventually replacing Burroughs RT650 with NCR 1780 equipment in the 
late-1980s). British savings banks, therefore, explored cost-efficient ways of 
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using readily-available technology to attract deposits from geographically-
remote customers. This included the opening of retail branches by the largest 
banks. However, tight regulation and under-developed strategic and risk 
management skills amongst the top echelons of management limited 
possibilities for all but a handful of individual organizations to exploit the 
new technology to its full potential.111 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we document the creation of electronic data-processing 
networks in British and Swedish savings banks in the early years of the digital 
economy. In particular, we consider how the first step towards a cash-free 
economy involved the digitalization of customer accounts and direct-to-
account payments, but in the absence of a fully deployed infrastructure, and in 
order to contain costs, there was a need to develop automatic cash-dispensing 
technology. 
We explore how groups of otherwise independent providers came 
together to achieve economies of scale while adopting OLRT computing, and 
we detail their attempts to influence the design of cash dispensers. 
Independent organizations with common historical origins through different 
trajectories attained leading positions in the field of cash dispensing. While 
the Swedish savings banks were prime movers, their British counterparts 
could watch and learn from the mistakes made by clearing banks.  
In both countries the networks were held together by umbrella 
organizations, but the common structure of the Swedish savings banks 
(already in place prior to the post-war period112), allowed active participation 
in the development of new technology in the decades that followed the end of 
World War II. As shown in the paper, managers at jointly-owned companies 
for purchases (Sparfrämjandet) and data processing (Spadab) played key roles 
in the adoption of computers, cash dispensers and OLRT systems in Sweden. 
The British network of savings banks was looser, but cooperation was 
strengthened over time, partly as a consequence of technological change but 
also responding to a change in government policy that drove their 
amalgamation into a single organization.   
The technological changes we study appear to have been demand-driven 
by the savings banks in both Sweden and the UK, but the incentives for the 
two networks to demand and shape new technological solutions were 
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somewhat different. In the Swedish case, competition with commercial banks 
over direct payroll accounts gave banks strong incentives to mechanize tasks, 
including cash dispensing. In the race to gain market shares and cut costs, 
Swedish banks initially accepted technical solutions with security flaws. In 
spite of early experiments with OLRT, the Swedish banks also began to build 
a network of cash dispensers that was not connected on-line.  
In the British case, the involvement of banks in wage payments came 
later, and the TSBs were less successful in the competition with commercial 
banks. The TSBs were initially more hesitant over computerization, and used 
bureau services and established technologies. For example, the TSBs first 
introduced cash dispensers at least three years after the clearing banks and 
their Swedish counterparts. The decimalization of sterling in 1971 was a 
major turning point and encouraged the TSBs to bring computer operations 
in-house. The computer center of the Manchester and Midlands region played 
a key role in the development of on-line cash dispensers in the 1970s, but the 
adoption of the technology was slow until the big clearing banks launched a 
fleet of new cash dispensers in 1978. Nevertheless, within a few years and 
while benefiting from newer technology and no legacy investments, the TSBs 
acquired a leading position in the use of computers, cash dispensing and 
OLRT.  
We make a perhaps unusual distinction between on-line and OLRT 
systems. This distinction begs the question, when is on-line not real-time 
processing? When considering the processing of data within the central 
processing unit then on-line is always OLRT. Indeed banks with a 
geographically-concentrated retail branch network and a relatively low 
volume of transactions took steps to link terminals and cash dispensers with 
their computer center (either physically or through modems and conventional 
telephone lines). This was the case for savings banks on the East coast of the 
USA,113 as well as savings banks in Manchester and Malmö. However, we 
also present several European examples where on-line terminals inside retail 
banks and cash dispensers were not OLRT. In such cases the cash dispenser 
updated the customer’s record after the transaction had taken place, avoiding 
long delays and minimizing customer inconvenience.  Alternatively, 
organizational procedures were such that transactions were stored and batched 
together, so that central files were updated once or twice per day. The on-line 
system at the TSBs also revealed how early computer technology could reach 
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capacity quite easily (at least as far as the transaction volume requirements of 
banks were concerned). These transactions were also characterized as 
relatively simple and standard.  
Our research also departs from the common assumption within economic 
history that the nature of the response of retail financial intermediaries to 
regulatory change and new technology is rather deterministic.114 We 
document how managers, especially middle-management, dealt with 
organizational change (or its absence) within groupings of the same 
organizational form in different geographies. As noted by Guerreiro 
Wilson115, in approaching new technology managers of British and Swedish 
savings banks required the machine to fit the work and not the other way 
around. Indeed, we document evidence stating how, in an effort to retain the 
custom of European banks, computer and cash dispenser manufacturers were 
ready to modify their equipment to suit the technical requirements and 
specifications of the savings banks. This further highlights the importance of 
European financial intermediaries to US computer manufacturers: when 
compared to the atomistic nature of American retail banking, large volumes of 
transactions and retail branch networks in Europe resulted in low-frequency 
but high-value orders of computer equipment. This evidence does not negate 
the importance of developments in computer technology in USA (particularly 
of manufacturers such as IBM and Burroughs, which were both suppliers of 
systems for the US military), but it does challenge naïve assumptions about 
the origins of technological change in financial services which acclaim the 
“… fact that many financial innovations originate in the US ...”.116 
In summary, we explore the first steps in the emergence of self-service 
technology and the changes it brought about for consumers and organizations 
active in retail financial market. We also develop an international comparison, 
with the purpose of researching technology and corporate strategy in their 
social and historical context, concerning the dynamics of the design, 
construction, development, implementation and use of specialized technology. 
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70 Elanders AB (EAB), Västerås, Sweden, Metior AB (MAB), Huvud- och 
dagböcker (HD) 1966-1971, (Series 1), Volume 8, December 20, 1966. 
Metior had also invited representatives from the police (Polistekniska 
rådgivningsbyrån) and a manufacturer of safes (most likely E A Rosengrens 
Kassaskåpsfabrik).  
71 Arfvidson, 2007. 
72 Ibid. 
73 EAB, MAB, HD, Vol 8, May 20, 1968. 
74 EAB, MAB, HD, Vol 10, February 1970. By 1971, Metior achieved a 
dominant position in Switzerland (where De La Rue had left the market), and 
was about to enter the French market in collaboration with Transac, a division 
of Compagnie Industrielle des Telecommunications (CIT). See further André 
Michaud, 2004. 
75 EAB, MAB, HD, Vol 15, 1971. 
76 1,100 units of Bankomat IV were sold in France between 1969 and 1977. 
Of these 250 were manufactured in Sweden and the rest in France by Transac. 
See Michaud, 2004, p. 30. 
77 Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2008. Harper and Bátiz-Lazo, 2013. 
78 Arfvidson, 2007. 
79 EAB, MAB, HD, Vol. 9, January 24, 1969. 
80 Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2008; Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2011. 
81 EAB, MAB, HD, Vol 10, 1970; EAB, MAB, HD, Vol 13, October 15, 
1971; and EAB, MAB, PM Protokoll, Rapporter, Vol 13, Sammanträde hos 
Bankföreningen, September 3, 1971 and Meddelande angående Metiors 
organization, 20 October, 1971. Metior had other problems that led to its 
takeover by Asea. For instance, in September 1971 technical problems 
resulted in the Swedish association of commercial banks questioning the 
benefits of further collaboration. As a rapidly expanding company Metior also 
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suffered from organizational problems. Its customers frequently complained 
about delayed correspondence. See also Arfvidson, 2007. 
82 Ibid. 
83 The IBM machine was also connected to NCR series 4200 machines. These 
devices were connected via modem to an IBM 2701 data adapter. The class 
4200 was an accounting machine and a cash register depending on the build 
of the device. It later became an electronic data input machine to output to 
punch tape and punch cards and then became an electronic calculating 
machine know as a Post-Tronic.  
84 Leif Arfvidson (previous head of R&D at Metior), email message to 
Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo, June 12, 2012. 
85 EAB, MAB, HD, Vol. 11, June 1970; EAB, MAB, HD, Vol. 15, 1971. 
86 Unless otherwise stated this paragraph borrows freely from Ekebrink, 1974, 
pp. 10-12. 
87 Arfvidson, 2007. 
88 Swedish patent number SE 401048, filed August 29, 1974, issued August 2, 
1979; US patent number 4020972, filed August 21, 1975, issued May 3, 1977. 
89 Arfvidson, 2007. Lars Arfvidson (previous head of R&D at Metior), email 
message to Björn Thodenius on May 5, 2012.  
90 Thodenius, 2008. 
91 Datasaab was at the start of their collaboration with Leif Lundblad and his 
Stockholm-based Inter Innovation Company. Lundblad had developed its own 
cash-dispensing mechanism to accommodate the differences between dollar 
notes and European currencies (Wentzel, 1996). The experience of Datasaab 
with the Docutel machines, combined with Lundblad’s dispensing 
mechanism, led to the decision to develop a Datasaab ATM. However, before 
a working machine had been presented, Datasaab became a part of Ericsson 
Information Systems. A number of machines were produced and installed 
around the world. 
92 Thodenius, 2008, p. 22. 
93 Arfvidson, 2007. 
94 ‘News from the Banks: West Midland,’ TSB Gazette. XXXIV, no. 4 
(October 1964), p. 158.  
95 Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2008, pp. 2-3. 
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97 B. R. Johnson ‘First steps in self-serving banking,’ TSB Gazette XXXVII, 
no. 3 (July 1967), pp. 74-80. 
98 Sprague, 1977, p. 31. 
99  Unless otherwise stated the reminder of this section borrows freely from 
interviews with Read and Taylor interviews (see note 54). The selection of 
Chubb and ICL as providers of equipment followed Harold Wilson’s and 
Tony Benn’s “buy British” policy rather than technical specifications and 
preferences of the TSBs’ computer staff. See further Billings and Booth, 
2011. 
100 Moss and Russell, 1994, p. 282. As noted above, at this point the TSB in 
Manchester was running a Sperry mainframe as the ICL/English Electric 
machine had been decommissioned. 
101 Ray Neal (director, TSB Computer Services and TSB Trust, 1959-1984), 
interview by Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo, Leicester, March 16, 2008. 
102 This transaction brought the total value of equipment ordered or installed 
at the TSBs by Burroughs during the previous 12 months to $34 million. CBI, 
Ascension 90, Series 72, Box 10, Folder 13, Item 9, ‘Large UK order,’ 
February 8, 1979. 
103 CBI, Ascension 90, Series 72, Box 10, Folder 6, Item 57, ‘RT5000,’ 
November 3, 1976. 
104 Bátiz-Lazo, 2009. 
105 Neal, interview. 
106 See further Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2008; Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2011. 
107 ‘Contracts 500 Cash Dispensers for Bank,’ The Times, September 10, 
1969. 
108 Taylor, interview. 
109 Unless otherwise stated the reminder of this paragraph borrows freely from 
Sarah Whitmore (retail branch staff, TSB, circa 1973-1980), interview by 
Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo, Leicester, February 8, 2008; Michael D McQuade, 
(branch manager and group manager, TSB, 1964-2000), interview by 
Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo, Leicester, March 6, 2008; Janet Shipley (retail branch 
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11, 2008. This machine was marketed as RT6500 to US banks from 1981 
onwards. 
110 On the travails of the clearing banks with computer technology see further 
Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, 2001; Booth, 2004; Martin, 2012; 
Booth, 2007. 
111 Neal and Taylor interview. 
112 As has been documented for Spain in Bátiz-Lazo and Maixé-Altés, 2011a; 
Bátiz-Lazo and Maixé-Altés, 2011b. 
113 Sanders, 1963, pp. 708-709. 
114 See for instance Edward P. M. Gardener et al., 1999. 
115  Wilson, 2008. 
116 Scott W. Frame and Lawrence J. White, 2009, p. 2. 
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Michaud, André. “Contribution à L ́Histoire De La Société Transac — 1970-
1982.” In 7e Colloque sur l'Histoire de l'Informatique et des 
Télécommunications, edited by Jacques André and Pierre Mounier-Kuhn. 
Rennes-Cesson (France): INRIA/Université de Rennes, 2004. 
 
 
Origins of the Cashless Society, c. 1965-1985 
 
136 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXII, 2014 
                                                                                                                    
Misa, Thomas J. “Understanding “How Computing Changed the World’.” 
IEEE Annals in the History of Computing 29 (2007): 52. 
 
Moss, Michael S. and Iain Russell. An Invaluable Treasure: A History of the 
TSB. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994. 
 
O'Brien, Donough. “Antony Cleaver.” In Who?: The Most Remarkable 
People You've Never Heard Of , edited by Donough O'Brien, 92-93.  London:  
Bene Factum Publishing, 2013. 
 
Payne, Peter L. “The Savings Bank of Glasgow, 1836-1914.” In Studies in 
Scottish Business History, edited by Peter L. Payne. London:  Cass, 1967. 
 
Revell, Jack. The British Financial System. London: Macmillan, 1973. 
 
Sanders, M. “Telefile - a Case Study of an Online Savings Bank Application.” 
Communications of the ACM 6 (1963): 708-712. 
 
Scott, Susan V.  and Markos Zachariadis. “Origins and Development of 
SWIFT, 1973-2009.” Business History 54 (2012): 462-482. 
 
Scott, Susan V. and Markos Zachariadis. The Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT): Cooperative Governance for 
Network Innovation, Standards, and Community. London: Routledge, 2013. 
 
Sinnott, Brendan. “Savings Banks Introduce Cheque Account.” in The Irish 
Times (Dublin: 1970). 
 
Sjölander, Anders.  Att reglera eller inte reglera: En undersökning av 
sparbanksfrågan i riksdagen 1882-1939.  Uppsala Papers in Financial History 
No 13, Uppsala: Department of Economic History, 2000. 
 
Spadab. Från fjäderpenna till microchip: Den tekniska utvecklingen I 
Sparbankerna. Stockholm: Sparfrämjandet, 1987. 
 
Bátiz-Lazo, Karlsson and Thodenius 
 
137 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXII, 2014 
                                                                                                                    
 
Sprague, Richard E. “Electronic Funds Transfer in Europe: Their Relevance 
for the United States.” Savings Banks International 3 (1977): 29-35. 
 
Stearns, David L. Electronic Value Exchange: Origins of the Visa Electronic 
Payment System. London: Springer, 2011. 
 
Thodenius, Björn. Teknisk utveckling i bankerna fram till 1985: Transkript av 
ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska museet den 12 november 2007. Stockholm: 
Avdelningen för teknik- och vetenskapshistoria, KTH, 2008. 
 
Thodenius, Björn, Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo and Tobias Karlsson. “The History of 
the Swedish ATM – Sparfrämjandet and Metior.” In History of Nordic 
Computing 3: Third Ifip Wg 9.7 Conference, Hinc 3, Stockholm, Sweden, 
October 18-20, 2010, Revised Selected Papers,, edited by John Impagliazzo, 
Per  Lundin and Benkt Wangler, 92-100.  Berlin & Heidelberg:  Springer, 
2011. 
 
Wadhwani, R. Daniel. “Organizational Form and Industry Emergence: Mutual 
and Nonprofit Firms in the Development of the US Personal Finance 
Industry.” Business History 53 (2011): 1152-1177. 
 
Wentzel, Viggo. “Pengar på Mintuten.” In Tema Bank : Datasaab och 
bankerna, edited by Hallberg, T. J. and B. Knutsson. Linköping: Datasaabs 
vänner, 1996. 
 
Wootton, Charles W. and Barbara E. Kemmerer. “The Emergence of 
Mechanical Accounting in the US, 1880-1930.” The Accounting Historians 
Journal 34 (2007): 91-124. 
 
Yates, JoAnne. “How Business Enterprises Use Technology: Extending the 
Demand-Side Turn.” Enterprise & Society 7 (2006): 422-455. 
 
